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Organizations interacting repeatedly on similar transactions may learn from prior experiences, allowing contracts to bespeciﬁed in greater detail. In this study, we analyze the conditions under which this learning effect is most likely to
manifest itself. We do this by focusing on different parts of a contract as well as differences across transacting parties.
Using a survey of information technology procurement contracts from 788 Dutch small- and medium-sized enterprises,
we show that the learning effect is stronger for technical than for legal detail in contracts and is stronger for ﬁrms with
information technology expertise than for ﬁrms without such expertise.
Key words : contractual detail; learning; repeated interactions; interorganizational relationships
History : Published online in Articles in Advance November 25, 2008.
Introduction
Complex contracting is an important mode of formal
governance and arguably more prevalent than either spot
markets or hierarchies (Powell 1987, Stinchcombe 1990,
Hennart 1993). Yet, as is now widely recognized, for-
mal contracts do not exist in a historical vacuum; they
are often enmeshed within the context of an ongoing
business relationship (Macaulay 1963, Macneil 1978,
Granovetter 1985). Drawing on this insight, several man-
agement scholars have begun to study how contractual
detail1—the extent to which relevant clauses are speci-
ﬁed in contracts—depends on the history of contracting
parties working together (Parkhe 1993, Luo 2002, Poppo
and Zenger 2002, Mayer and Argyres 2004, Ryall and
Sampson 2009). Apart from its theoretical signiﬁcance,
such research also has direct practical implications,
as businesses could gain from a sharper understanding
of how the nature and role of contract changes when
they contract repeatedly with each other.
An important line of reasoning suggests that repeated
interaction among contracting parties generates learn-
ing about how to specify the contract. For instance,
Mayer and Argyres (2004) show that partners that inter-
act repeatedly gradually learn more about the nature of
the transaction they are engaging in and document this
learning in their contracts. Contracting parties discover
how the supplier’s product interacts with the buyer’s
systems and processes. Each may also learn about spe-
ciﬁc ways in which the partner ﬁrm does business
and effective ways for the two parties to collaborate.
Because contracts may serve as a repository for this
common knowledge, and because such knowledge accu-
mulates through repeated interactions, a history of prior
interactions may coexist with highly detailed contracts
(Argyres et al. 2007).
Such learning effects can be important if we keep
in mind that contracts serve not only as mechanisms
for aligning incentives between parties, but also as a
framework to coordinate their actions (Llewellyn 1931).
Learning as enshrined in contracts is an important
manifestation of the general phenomenon of learning
to manage interﬁrm relationships effectively. As other
scholars have demonstrated, such learning effects can
have important strategic consequences for ﬁrms, as
they can substantially improve the performance of their
exchange relationships—and ultimately their own per-
formance (Anand and Khanna 2000; Kale et al. 2000,
2002).
Our contribution in this paper is to analyze the con-
ditions under which the learning effect is likely to
be stronger or weaker by predicting differences in the
marginal effects of prior interactions on contractual
detail. In doing so, we focus sharply on the learning
effect and avoid confounding with other consequences
of relationship history. As the work of several schol-
ars suggests, it is an empirical challenge to avoid con-
founding the learning effect with other consequences
of prior interactions—such as trust. Organizational
researchers have argued conceptually and shown empiri-
cally that interﬁrm trust increases with prior interactions
(Anderson and Weitz 1989, Parkhe 1993). The conse-
quences of this increased trust for contracts however
remain unclear: although some scholars report a nega-
tive relationship between trust (or its proxies, such as
prior interactions) and contractual/governance complex-
ity (Crocker and Reynolds 1993, Parkhe 1993, Gulati
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1995, Corts and Singh 2004), others report a positive
association (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995, Luo 2002,
Poppo and Zenger 2002, Ryall and Sampson 2009). It is
not the purpose of the present study to decide between
these arguments (see Puranam and Vanneste 2009 for a
discussion). Rather, we note that regardless of whether
trust formed through prior interactions encourages or
discourages the use of detailed contracts, it makes the
learning effect harder to identify—either by mimicking
it or suppressing it, respectively. Put simply, it is difﬁcult
to test arguments about learning effects only by examin-
ing the relationship between prior interactions and con-
tractual detail.
Instead, we adopt the widely followed strategy for
eliminating alternative explanations in social science
theory—to validate the existence of the learning effect,
we rely on identifying sources of variation in the mag-
nitude of the learning effect (Stinchcombe 1987). We
argue that the learning effect is stronger for techni-
cal clauses than for legal clauses and for transactors
with at least some in-house information technology (IT)
expertise than for those with none. Under these con-
ditions, we expect that a history of prior relationships
can coexist with fairly detailed contracts, because of the
learning effects that arise from that history. We test our
arguments using data from a survey of IT procurement
contracts entered into by 788 Dutch small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). Our results broadly support
our arguments.
Theory
Learning and Repeated Contracting
A contract is “an agreement which is legally enforce-
able or legally recognized as creating a duty” (Atiyah
1989, p. 40). The precise role ascribed to contracts dif-
fers by theoretical lens. In agency theory, the use of
contracts is twofold: incentive alignment and risk shar-
ing (Eisenhardt 1989). In transaction cost economics,
contracts are seen as offering (imperfect) protection
against opportunistic behavior (Williamson 1975, 1985;
Klein et al. 1978). Contractual clauses place penalties
on noncooperative behavior, making such behavior less
likely, or at least offering compensation in the event of
such behavior. Property rights theorists view contracts as
spelling out speciﬁc rights to ensure that the nonowner
uses the asset in such a way that the interests of the
owner are not harmed (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart
and Moore 1990).
In all these economic theories, the main purpose of
contractual clauses is to mitigate inefﬁciencies created
by incentive conﬂict. However, a contract also provides a
blueprint for conducting an exchange (Macaulay 1963).
This blueprint captures the roles and responsibilities of
each party and documents mutual expectations that allow
companies to align their actions (Mayer and Argyres
2004). Thus, a contract, like other forms of governance,
is also an important coordination device (Gulati et al.
2005).
Effective contracts can help mitigate incentive con-
ﬂicts and coordination problems among transacting
parties, but writing such contracts is both cognitively
challenging and costly. Given bounded rationality, it is
problematic or even impossible to foresee all future rel-
evant contingencies at the beginning of a transaction
(Simon 1957). Hence, contracts necessarily leave out
some relevant detail (Williamson 1975, 1985). However,
repeated interactions on broadly similar transactions can
help partners learn how to contract better. Organizations
not only learn from each other (e.g., Hamel 1991), but
they also learn how to collaborate with each other, such
as in alliances (e.g., Doz 1996), networks (e.g., Dyer
1996), and mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Zollo and
Singh 2004). Such learning is experiential, incremental,
and largely partner speciﬁc (Doz 1996, Zollo et al. 2002,
Zollo and Winter 2002).
Indicative of experiential learning, Mayer and Argyres
(2004) ﬁnd that contractual changes are primarily driven
by actual problems experienced rather than by poten-
tial problems foreseen. These problems could arise from
incentive conﬂict or from genuine misunderstandings.
Even when relevant contingencies are identiﬁed, it may
take several iterations to understand how these should
be effectively addressed in a contract. The codiﬁca-
tion of this new knowledge in the contract enhances
coordination by creating common knowledge among
the contracting parties (Camerer and Knez 1996). Cod-
iﬁcation also guards against organizational forgetting
and directly enhances the learning experience (Argote
1999, Zollo and Winter 2002). Further, codiﬁcation in
a contract leverages its potential enforceability, thus
avoiding opportunistic attempts to renege on implicitly
understood but noncontracted terms. Thus, because con-
tracts can serve as repositories for knowledge about
what and how to transact, and because such knowl-
edge accumulates through repeated similar interactions,
the task-speciﬁc components of contracts may become
increasingly detailed as the relationship matures (Mayer
and Argyres 2004, Ryall and Sampson 2009). We call
this the learning effect—the tendency toward using more
detailed contracts as a consequence of enhanced knowl-
edge about what to specify in a contract that arises from
repeated interactions between partners.
To avoid confounding learning with other conse-
quences of repeated interaction between partners (such
as trust), we focus in this paper on identifying the con-
ditions under which the learning effect is likely to be
stronger or weaker, leaving other aspects of the relation-
ship (relatively) unchanged. If we can show that such
conditions covary with changes in the extent to which
contracts become more detailed with repeated interac-
tions (i.e., changes to the marginal effects of prior inter-
actions), then we can claim stronger evidence for the
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existence of the learning effect than is possible simply
by examining the association between relationship his-
tory and contractual detail.
Scope for Learning: Technical vs.
Legal Clauses
Contracts are complex documents with various types of
clauses that range from standardized to transaction spe-
ciﬁc clauses (Macaulay 1963, Ben-Shahar and White
2006). The impact of prior interactions on the extent
to which clauses are speciﬁed in detail is unlikely to
be identical for these different kinds of clauses (Whang
1992, Ryall and Sampson 2009). We will argue that the
effects of learning will be stronger on those clauses that
are speciﬁc to the transaction. In particular, we will dis-
tinguish between technical and legal clauses and argue
that the impact of prior interactions on contractual detail
is greater on the former than on the latter.
Both technical and legal clauses can form part of a
contract and have prima facie similar status in a court
of law. However, they differ in their content. Technical
clauses specify the requirements of the product or ser-
vice being procured, such as the desired performance
and functions (Whang 1992). These clauses are speciﬁc
to the class of product, technology, and partner. Often
technology specialists, not lawyers, are primarily respon-
sible for drafting technical clauses (Argyres and Mayer
2007). As a result, organizations learn which contingen-
cies are relevant to technical clauses from prior inter-
actions involving the exchange of products of a similar
nature.
Legal clauses are qualitatively different from techni-
cal clauses, as they specify the legal terms of trade,
penalties, and dispute-resolution processes rather than
the speciﬁcs of the goods and services being trans-
acted (Whang 1992). To a large extent, these are stan-
dardized clauses based on existing templates and are
drafted by lawyers who provide similar services to
multiple ﬁrms (Macaulay 1963, Buskens 2002). A key
implication of the distinction is that the same legal
clauses can be applied to a wider range of transactions,
whereas technical clauses—because of their transaction-
speciﬁc nature—are only applicable in contracts for spe-
ciﬁc kinds of products. Organizations have substantially
greater experience at transacting in general than at trans-
acting a speciﬁc kind of product or service. Thus, when
drafting a contract, an organization may draw on wide-
ranging experiences that extend beyond the focal trans-
action for legal clauses. However, for technical clauses,
an organization will have less relevant prior knowledge
to build on.
These differences have implications for the value of
an additional interaction in generating learning that can
be used to specify more detailed contractual clauses,
because learning from experience shows decreasing
marginal returns (Yelle 1979, Dutton and Thomas 1984).
Because an organization is more likely to have higher
levels of relevant experience for drafting legal clauses
than technical clauses, and as the rate of learning
declines with experience, we expect the learning effect
to be stronger for technical clauses than for legal clauses.
We can therefore predict a stronger learning effect in
technical than in legal clauses; this should translate into
a greater marginal effect of prior interactions on con-
tractual detail.
Hypothesis 1. The marginal effect of prior interac-
tions on the detail with which technical clauses are spec-
iﬁed will be greater than on the detail with which legal
clauses are speciﬁed.
Capacity for Learning: Expertise in
the Technical Domain
All ﬁrms may learn more about technical clauses
through prior interactions of a similar nature, but the rate
at which ﬁrms learn may differ. In particular, we argue
that possession of expertise relevant to the domain of the
products/services being procured can signiﬁcantly lever-
age learning rates (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Zahra and
George 2002). Because learning occurs in part through
building new associations between familiar concepts
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990), being knowledgeable in
a broader domain is often helpful when attempting to
learn something speciﬁc. For example, students who are
thoroughly familiar with algebra ﬁnd it easier to under-
stand advanced calculus topics (Ellis 1965). Likewise,
when contracting parties possess competence relevant
to the domain of what is being exchanged, they are
more likely to beneﬁt from the lessons of experience
and extract insights about how to better specify technical
clauses.
A supplier would typically have expertise relevant to
the technical domain, but the same does not hold for a
buyer. A buyer is not necessarily an expert in the prod-
ucts or services being bought (which is often the reason
for buying in the ﬁrst place) and therefore there is bound
to be variation across buyers in the extent of relevant
expertise they possess. If buyers with relevant exper-
tise are able to extract more useful information from
interactions than buyers without such expertise (Cohen
and Levinthal 1990, Zahra and George 2002), then we
would expect that for such buyers, the positive associ-
ation between prior interactions and contractual detail
will be even stronger.
In principle, the availability of relevant related exper-
tise should enhance learning about both the technical
and legal aspects of a transaction. However, given our
arguments that learning plays a more important role in
the speciﬁcation of technical clauses than legal clauses
(Hypothesis 1), we focus on the impact of relevant
expertise on the detail with which technical clauses are
speciﬁed. We therefore predict that the learning effect
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for technical clauses is stronger when the buyer pos-
sesses expertise in the relevant technical domain.
Hypothesis 2. A buyer’s expertise in the technical
domain positively moderates the marginal effect of prior
interactions on the detail with which technical clauses
are speciﬁed.
Methods
Data
We test our hypotheses on a sample of IT procurement
transactions, which vary in the extent to which the trans-
actors have engaged in similar transactions in the past.
IT procurement transactions provide a good setting to
study contractual detail because there is wide variation
in transactional difﬁculties associated with the com-
plexity of products and services being procured, coor-
dination challenges, and switching costs (Lacity et al.
1995). Several prior studies of procurement and con-
tracting are also set in this context, enabling compara-
bility with our study (Poppo and Zenger 2002, Kalnins
and Mayer 2004, Mayer and Argyres 2004). We use
survey data on IT purchases by Dutch SMEs from
the External Management of Automation database. In
Dutch, “automation” is an umbrella term that covers
all forms of IT supporting business processes. A group
of researchers associated with Utrecht University col-
lected the data (Batenburg and Raub 1995, Rooks et al.
1998) and made part of it publicly available through
The Steinmetz Archive (www.dans.knaw.nl). The group
also shared the nonpublic part of the data with us very
generously.
The unit of analysis in this study is an IT purchase
transaction, as reported by the buyer. The IT purchases
in this data consist of software and/or hardware and vary
from standard off-the-shelf products, such as adminis-
trative software and computers, to customized products,
such as logistics software and networks. The SME buy-
ers have between 5 and 200 employees and are active in
a diverse range of industries, such as agriculture, con-
struction, education, insurances, and transportation. All
suppliers are from the IT industry.
The External Management of Automation database
has two major advantages for the purposes of this study.
First, across SMEs there is signiﬁcant variation in IT
expertise, reﬂecting differences in expertise in the prod-
uct domain. The suppliers, being IT vendors, can all be
expected to have IT expertise. This allows us to focus
on the effects of variations in relevant expertise among
the purchasing SMEs on contractual detail. Second, the
SMEs do not have the capabilities to produce in house;
nor do they have the ﬁnancial means to integrate back-
ward. In the survey about 96% of the buyers indicated
that it was (very) difﬁcult, if not impossible, to make
the product/service they were procuring themselves. The
make-buy decision is therefore exogenous to our frame-
work, which lessens concerns about sample selection
bias. In the survey each buyer was asked about a single
IT transaction from a single IT supplier (see Batenburg
1997a for a complete survey description). The survey
was administered in two periods, in 1995 and 1998.
To obtain sufﬁcient variation on several key con-
structs, a random stratiﬁed sampling method was used
in 1995. The sampling frame was constructed from
Directview, a database of Dutch SMEs that is updated
annually and that was estimated to have covered 80% of
all Dutch SMEs. Three stratiﬁcation criteria were used:
(1) type of IT purchase—simple or complex and soft-
ware or hardware,2 (2) number of IT specialists—none
or some, and (3) interconnections in the industry—well
linked versus poorly linked. A total of 1,325 SMEs that
were suitable for the study were contacted. Of the ﬁrms
contacted, 67% agreed to cooperate. Of all ﬁrms that
agreed to participate, 87% actually completed a survey
(Batenburg 1997b). This resulted in a response rate of
59% for the ﬁrst survey. An interviewer visited 83%
of the respondents for data collection. For the remain-
ing respondents, surveys were mailed. After ﬁnishing
the survey, respondents were asked to ﬁll in an addi-
tional survey on a different transaction, if possible, with
the same supplier. No interviewer was present for these
additional surveys. A total of 971 surveys were collected
from 788 SMEs in 1995. Response analysis showed that
non-participating ﬁrms did not differ signiﬁcantly from
participating ﬁrms on important characteristics such as
size, industry, or region. Furthermore, a question asked
during the initial contact revealed that they also did
not differ in their general satisfaction with IT suppliers
(Batenburg 1997b).
The second wave of data collection occurred in 1998.
All participating ﬁrms from 1995 were contacted by
phone; 84% could be reached (Rooks 2002). They were
asked to ﬁll out a new survey on a different product, but
if possible from the same supplier. All surveys were sent
by mail. An additional 281 transactions were collected
in 1998, which represented 36% of the buyers. After
eliminating observations that did not meet the criteria of
buyer size that deﬁned an SME (5 to 200 employees)
and respondent involvement necessary for a key infor-
mant (61+ 56), we were left with a combined sample
of 1,135 transactions by 788 buyers. On average each
buyer had 1.4 transactions, with a maximum of 3. The
data do not allow us to uniquely identify suppliers. Miss-
ing values caused the number of observations to drop to
between 840 and 761 in the analyses.
Measures
Most constructs are based on multiple items with ﬁxed
answer categories. Appendix A gives an overview of
the questions used for the key constructs. The original
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questions were asked in Dutch. We conducted our own
independent translation into English in addition to the
translation provided by the survey authors to ensure their
validity.
Dependent Variables
Technical detail is the extent to which technical speciﬁ-
cations of the product or service being procured are spec-
iﬁed in the contract. Respondents indicated the degree
of speciﬁcation on four items: security, user friendliness,
deﬁnition of system boundaries, and deﬁnition of sys-
tem functions. These items were constructed on the basis
of analysis of contracts, discussion with lawyers, and a
pilot test. For each item, a ﬁve-point answer scale ranged
from “very broadly” to “very detailed.” If an item did
not apply, respondents were asked to indicate “not appli-
cable.” We decided to code “not applicable” as zero and
to include those items in the analysis. In the robustness
section we explore alternative speciﬁcations with respect
to the coding of “not applicable.” Technical detail is the
standardized sum of responses to these four items, which
is in line with previous research (Saussier 2000, Luo
2002). The scale has good reliability, with a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.87. The goodness of ﬁt index from conﬁrma-
tory factor analysis is 0.89, which is satisfactory (Lattin
et al. 2003).
Legal detail was measured through 10 items describ-
ing legal clauses of the transaction, such as liability of
supplier, dispute resolution, and penalties on late pay-
ment. The items are given in Appendix A. As with
items for technical detail, these items were also derived
inductively. For each item, the respondent was asked
to indicate whether it was “not arranged,” “only orally
arranged,” or “arranged in writing.” The frequency with
which the legal clauses were arranged in writing ranges
from 14% to 80% in our sample, with the median being
31.5%. This indicates that these clauses were not merely
boilerplate clauses that are always included irrespective
of relevance. In the Dutch legal system, oral agreements
are also legally binding but are much harder to prove in
court than written agreements. Therefore, we code “not
arranged” as zero, “oral agreement” as one, and “written
agreement” as two.3 We measure legal detail as the stan-
dardized average of the scores on the 10 items. The reli-
ability of the scale is good, with a Cronbach’s alpha of
0.84.45 Note that each item individually is not an appro-
priate measure of the detail with which a particular legal
clause is speciﬁed, as an item indicates whether and how
a particular clause was arranged. However, collectively
the items should give a good indication of the legal detail
of a contract or the extent to which legal clauses are
speciﬁed. Thus, we can conceptually compare our aggre-
gate measures of technical and legal detail. To enable
statistical comparison of the effects of independent vari-
ables on technical and legal detail, we standardize both
measures. In the robustness section, we discuss addi-
tional analyses that support the comparability of both
measures.
Independent Variables
Prior interactions as a variable is measured as the num-
ber of times buyer and supplier had done business prior
to the focal transaction (Gulati 1995, Buskens 2002,
Corts and Singh 2004). Obtaining the precise number of
prior interactions in survey-based studies of this nature is
difﬁcult. We relied instead on data from an item in which
respondents indicated the number of times they inter-
acted with the supplier in the past on a six-point scale
ranging from “never” to “many times.”6 The response to
this question was corroborated with another survey item
in which respondents indicated the volume of business
in prior interactions with the supplier. The correlation
between these items was 0.92. About half the transac-
tions in our data (54%) involved a history of at least
some prior interactions.
Expertise in the technical domain was captured by
a dummy variable coding whether the procuring ﬁrm
had any employees with expertise in IT (Boynton et al.
1994). Almost all SMEs indicated that they were unable
to produce the product they were procuring in house, yet
56% of them had employees with IT expertise. Thus, this
variable captures related but distinct knowledge in the
technical domain. The suppliers were IT vendors, so we
expected all of them to be competent in the technical
domain.
Control Variables
We control for several characteristics of the transaction,
buyer, and supplier that might impact the dependent and
independent variables.
Transaction Characteristics. We control for transac-
tion size with a measure of the ﬁnancial volume of
the transaction on a ﬁve-point scale. The boundaries of
the qualitative categories are from fewer than 25,000 to
more than 200,000 Dutch guilders (1 guilder is about
0.45 euro). We also control for type of product by insert-
ing dummies for software and hardware. Respondents
were asked to choose which products and services were
included in the transaction from a list of 15 alternatives
(multiple choices were allowed). These products and
services broadly clustered into standard software, cus-
tomized software, standard hardware, customized hard-
ware, and additional services. We code a transaction as
software when it has at least one software product and no
hardware products. Similarly, we code a transaction as
hardware when at least one hardware product is involved
but no software products. The omitted category is trans-
actions that have both software and hardware products.
Only one transaction in the ﬁnal sample had solely non-
software or nonhardware products (e.g., training). This
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transaction is included in the omitted category.7 Next,
we include a measure of product complexity. Using the
same list of 15 possible products, this measure is cal-
culated as the sum of the different products or services
included in the transaction. A more complex transaction
is likely associated with more coordination and coopera-
tion difﬁculties between buyer and supplier, which may
be reﬂected in the contractual structure of the transaction
(Gulati and Singh 1998).8
We include a measure of costs of failure to capture
the perceived difﬁculties and costs involved in switching
to a different product or supplier, in the event of a prod-
uct failure (Batenburg et al. 2003). It is measured as the
average of three items, in which the respondent indicates
on a ﬁve-point scale (from “very little” to “very much”)
the magnitude of costs for a new product purchase, per-
sonnel training, and data reentry in the event of product
failure (Cronbach’s alpha= 075). We include a measure
of supplier alternatives to describe the extent of avail-
ability of alternative suppliers and products to the buyer
before signing the contract. The availability of alterna-
tives may substitute for contractual detail in controlling
opportunism (Williamson 1975). The mean of two items
with ﬁve-point scales (from “very few” to “very many”)
is used to measure the alternative possibilities the buyer
faced in terms of products and suppliers (Cronbach’s
alpha= 074). We also include a measure selection dif-
ﬁculty to control for the possibility of adverse selection
(Akerlof 1970). When it is difﬁcult to assess the quality
of a product, the buyer may want to invest more heavily
in contractual detail as ex post protection. In contrast,
it may be that in precisely such situations contractual
detail is of less use because it is difﬁcult to verify
whether contractual clauses have been honored (Mayer
2006, Argyres et al. 2007). Therefore, we do not have a
strong prior about the effect of this variable. The mea-
sure is constructed as the mean of three items that ask
about the difﬁculty of evaluating the price/quality ratio
of potential suppliers, comparing the product with other
products, and assessing the product’s quality at deliv-
ery. All items used ﬁve-point scales with the extreme
answer categories of “very easy” and “very difﬁcult.”
The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.78.
We control for expected future interactions, which
make cooperation and reciprocity more likely. Expected
future interactions may lead to less reliance on contrac-
tual detail for ensuring cooperation (Axelrod 1984). But
a longer future may make it worth investing more heav-
ily in additional safeguards (Williamson 1985). There-
fore, we remain agnostic about the aggregate effect of
expected future interactions. This is measured with a sin-
gle item asking to what extent future interactions were
expected at the time of contract signing. The extreme
categories of the ﬁve-point answer scale are “not likely”
and “very likely.” We also insert dummies for the year of
purchase to capture possible period effects. We control
for the product’s criticalness for buyer proﬁts. If a prod-
uct is very critical, the damage potential will be large
and the buyer may want to limit the dangers by using
a more detailed contract (Batenburg et al. 2003). This
construct is captured by a single item with a ﬁve-point
scale from “not important” to “very important” that asks:
“How important was this product for the proﬁtability of
your ﬁrm?”
Buyer and Supplier Characteristics. We control for
legal expertise of the buyer. This is measured by a
dummy variable asking whether the ﬁrm had any em-
ployees with legal expertise (Buskens 2002). We also
control for buyer size. This is measured as the natu-
ral log of the number of employees at the time of the
purchase. Furthermore, we control for buyer’s indus-
try. We inserted dummies for the two-digit Dutch SBI
codes of the buyer’s industry, which are comparable to
the American SIC codes. For the supplier we control
for supplier size. This is measured on a ﬁve-point scale
with boundaries of the qualitative categories from “less
than 5” to “more than 50” employees.
Results
Table 1 reports the summary statistics and pairwise cor-
relations between variables used in our analysis. The
largest correlation is 0.75 between prior interactions and
the interaction term of prior interactions and IT exper-
tise. To assess potential collinearity concerns, we calcu-
lated variance inﬂation factors for all estimated models.
These were well within acceptable limits.
Table 2 reports results from ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression models for both technical and legal
detail. We adjust the standard errors for possible non-
independence in our sample by clustering the observa-
tions of the same buyer. The ﬁrst column (Model 1a)
reports the base model of 840 observations for 581 dif-
ferent buyers consisting of only the control variables,
with technical detail as the dependent variable. This base
model is signiﬁcant (R2 = 022, p < 001). Firms with
IT expertise, our measure of buyer’s expertise relevant to
the product domain, have more technically detailed con-
tracts than ﬁrms without such expertise (p < 005). The
size of the transaction, costs of failure, and the complex-
ity and criticalness of the product are associated with
greater technical detail. Pure hardware products have
less technically detailed contracts than combined soft-
ware and hardware products, and pure software prod-
ucts have the most technical detail. Selection difﬁculty
has no effect on technical detail. It is possible that the
additional protection from technical detail in such cir-
cumstances does not outweigh the difﬁculty of specify-
ing them in our setting. The variable of expected future
interactions is not signiﬁcantly associated with techni-
cal detail. Again, it is feasible that in our setting, the
longer payoff period for any safeguard investments does
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Table 2 Results of OLS Regression Analyses for Contractual Detail
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b
Technical Legal Technical Legal Technical Legal
Variables detail detail detail detail detail detail
Prior interactions −004 −005 −010 −008
002∗ 002∗∗ 003∗∗∗ 003∗∗
Prior interactions2 004 001 005 000
002∗∗ 002 002∗∗ 002
Interactions ∗ IT 011 004
004∗∗∗ 004
Interactions2 ∗ IT −003 000
003 003
IT expertise 014 −006 014 −005 024 −007
007∗∗ 007 007∗ 007 013∗ 013
Transaction size 008 011 008 011 007 011
003∗∗ 003∗∗∗ 003∗∗ 003∗∗∗ 003∗∗ 003∗∗∗
Software 028 027 024 022 024 022
010∗∗∗ 011∗∗ 011∗∗ 011∗ 010∗∗ 011∗
Hardware −018 005 −018 005 −019 004
011∗ 010 011 010 011∗ 010
Product complexity 006 007 006 007 006 007
001∗∗∗ 001∗∗∗ 001∗∗∗ 002∗∗∗ 001∗∗∗ 002∗∗∗
Costs of failure 016 014 016 013 016 013
004∗∗∗ 004∗∗∗ 004∗∗∗ 004∗∗∗ 004∗∗∗ 004∗∗∗
Alternatives −004 −006 −004 −006 −004 −006
004 004 004 004 004 004
Selection difﬁculty −003 −000 −003 000 −004 000
004 004 004 004 004 004
Expected future −001 −001 000 002 000 002
003 003 003 003 003 003
Criticalness 009 004 009 004 010 004
003∗∗∗ 004 003∗∗∗ 004 003∗∗∗ 004
Legal expertise −008 012 −006 012 −007 012
010 010 009 010 009 010
Buyer size −000 −010 −000 −009 −000 −009
005 005∗∗ 005 005∗ 005 005∗
Supplier size 002 013 002 013 002 013
003 003∗∗∗ 003 003∗∗∗ 003 003∗∗∗
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year of purchase dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant −084 −074 −098 −088 −106 −086
043∗ 045∗ 044∗∗ 045∗∗ 043∗∗ 045∗
Observations 840 765 835 761 835 761
d.f. 60 60 62 62 64 64
F 577∗∗∗ 922∗∗∗ 619∗∗∗ 955∗∗∗ 642∗∗∗ 947∗∗∗
R2 022 031 023 031 024 031
Note. Robust standard errors with clustering for same buyer in parentheses. Signiﬁcance marks and standard errors are based on a
common robust covariance matrix for technical and legal detail.
∗p < 010, ∗∗p < 005, ∗∗∗p < 001 in a two-tailed test.
not outweigh the assurance generated through the poten-
tial value of future interactions. The remaining controls,
alternatives, legal expertise, and buyer and supplier size
are not signiﬁcant.
The second column (Model 1b) shows the same base
model but with legal detail as the dependent variable.
The number of observations is slightly lower: 765 for
543 different buyers. This base model is also signiﬁcant
(R2 = 031, p < 001). The effect of the control vari-
ables on legal detail is largely similar to that on techni-
cal detail, though intuitively, legal expertise is associated
with more legal detail but not more technical detail. Con-
versely, IT expertise is not associated with more legal
detail. Also, ﬁrm size affects legal but not technical
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detail. Interestingly, a larger buyer is associated with less
legal detail, but a larger supplier is associated with more
legal detail. If these factors can be taken as indicators for
market power, this ﬁnding would suggest that depend-
ing on who has more power the effect on legal detail is
different.
In Model 2a, with technical detail as the depen-
dent variable, we add our measure of prior interactions
as well as its squared term to allow for possible
curvilinearity—it is well established that learning from
experience shows decreasing marginal returns (Yelle
1979, Dutton and Thomas 1984). For this and subse-
quent models of technical detail, the number of differ-
ent buyers remains unchanged, but because of missing
data the number of observations drops to 835. The lin-
ear term of prior interactions is negative (p= 008), and
the squared term is positive (p = 003). To explore dif-
ferences in type of contractual clauses, we estimate the
same model speciﬁcation, except with legal detail as the
dependent variable. The number of observations for this
and following models of legal detail is 761, and the
number of different buyers is 541. We ﬁnd that prior
interactions have a negative direct effect on legal detail
(p = 002), and the squared term of prior interactions
is not signiﬁcant (p= 072). The absence of an upward
sloping component to the effect of prior interactions on
legal detail could be because learning for legal detail is
not only weaker than for technical detail (as we argue
in Hypothesis 1), but is weak in absolute terms.
Figure 1 plots the estimated relationship between prior
interactions on the one hand and technical detail (full
line) or legal detail (dotted line) on the other. The dif-
ference between technical and legal detail is striking.
For technical detail, the effect of prior interactions is
not only curvilinear but is in fact nonmonotonic—i.e.,
there is a stationary point at which the curve has a min-
imum, resulting in a U-shaped relationship. Technical
detail initially decreases signiﬁcantly with prior interac-
tions (p < 002 at prior interactions at the low end of the
Figure 1 Effect of Prior Interactions on Technical and Legal
Detail
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scale), and for high levels of prior interactions this effect
reverses (p < 006 at prior interactions at the high end of
the scale). It is possible that at low levels of prior inter-
action, the learning effect is dominated by some other
consequence of relationship history that creates a decline
in contractual detail (e.g., trust as discussed by Gulati
1995). In contrast, for legal detail we ﬁnd no evidence
for an upward sloping (learning) component, or at least
if it exists, it is perhaps dominated by a trust effect. Note
that in the ﬁgure the axis of prior interactions represents
qualitative categories (from “never” to “many times”),
which cannot be interpreted as exact numbers.
In Hypothesis 1 we predict a greater marginal effect of
prior interactions on technical detail than on legal detail.
Graphically, this claim seems supported, as there are no
increases in legal detail with increasing interactions, but
there is at least some range of prior interactions over
which technical detail increases. We turn to quantitative
evidence to formally support or reject the hypothesis.
Because technical and legal detail are standardized, the
effect of prior interactions on both is directly compara-
ble. The marginal effect of prior interactions on either
technical or legal detail, 1+ 22 ∗ (Prior_interactions)
(Models 2a and 2b), indicates how many standard devi-
ations either technical or legal detail changes per one
unit increase on the prior interactions scale. The differ-
ence in marginal effect of prior interactions on technical
and legal detail is not constant because of the nonmono-
tonic effect for technical detail. As is usual for nonlinear
functions, to test Hypothesis 1, we evaluate the differ-
ence in marginal effects at the mean of the number of
prior interactions. This is a conservative test in the sense
that a difference at the mean supports the hypothesis of
different marginal effects, but no difference at the mean
could still be consistent with differences at other points
over the range of the independent variable. To statisti-
cally compare the marginal effects across models, we
obtain the joint variance-covariance matrix to allow the
errors of both models to be correlated.
We ﬁnd that the difference in marginal effects at the
mean of prior interactions is positive in favor of techni-
cal detail, but statistically the difference is not signiﬁcant
(nor for values below the mean). However, for levels of
prior interactions above the mean, the marginal effect of
prior interactions on technical detail is marginally sig-
niﬁcantly greater than on legal detail (005<p< 008).
Speciﬁcally, at high levels of prior interactions, with an
additional increment in prior interactions, legal detail
would decrease a mere 0.01 standard deviation. In con-
trast, technical detail would increase no less than 0.19
standard deviations. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is weakly sup-
ported for the upper range of prior interactions. The
marginal effect of prior interactions is larger on techni-
cal than on legal detail, though the difference occurs at
higher levels of prior interactions.
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We turn to Model 3a to test whether a buyer’s
expertise in the product domain increases the marginal
effect of prior interactions on the detail of technical
clauses (Hypothesis 2). Model 3a includes the interac-
tions of IT expertise with the linear and squared term
of prior interactions on technical detail. A joint test
of the interaction terms of IT expertise with the lin-
ear and squared term of prior interactions shows that
IT expertise moderates the relationship between prior
interactions and technical detail (p= 002). In particu-
lar, the interaction effect of IT expertise with the linear
term of prior interactions is strongly positive (p < 001).
To test Hypothesis 2, we evaluate whether a buyer’s
expertise in the product domain increases the marginal
effect of prior interactions at the mean of prior interac-
tions. As before, this is a conservative test in the sense
that a difference at the mean supports the hypothesis
of different marginal effects, but no difference at the
mean could still be consistent with differences at other
points over the range of the independent variable. The
marginal effect of prior interaction on technical detail
in this model is 1 + 22 ∗ Prior_interactions + 4 ∗
IT_expertise + 25 ∗ Prior_interactions ∗ IT_expertise
(Model 3a), obtained by taking the ﬁrst derivate of tech-
nical detail with respect to prior interactions. We ﬁnd
that the marginal effect of prior interactions is signiﬁ-
cantly greater for ﬁrms with IT expertise than for ﬁrms
without such expertise at the mean of prior interactions
(p < 001). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. The moder-
ation effect of IT expertise on the relationships between
prior interactions and technical detail is shown in
Figure 2.
For completeness, we also present the results for legal
detail in Model 3b. Neither the interaction of IT exper-
tise with the linear term of prior interactions (p= 027)
nor the interaction with the squared term of prior inter-
actions is signiﬁcant (p = 093). Also, they are not
jointly signiﬁcant (p = 043). Hence, IT expertise does
Figure 2 Moderation Effect of IT Expertise on Prior
Interactions and Technical Detail
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not moderate the impact of prior interactions on legal
detail.9
Robustness Checks
Like most studies of procurement relationships (e.g.,
Artz and Brush 2000, Poppo and Zenger 2002, Gulati
et al. 2005), our study employs data from a single
respondent from the buying company for each trans-
action. To limit the concerns about respondent bias,
we reestimated all models with an added control: the
respondent’s employment duration with the ﬁrm (Kumar
et al. 1993). This control was not signiﬁcant, nor did
it change any of the results. A single respondent may
in general cause concern about common method bias
(Podsakoff et al. 2003), but this does not appear to be an
issue in our study. Common method bias alone cannot
explain the nonmonotonic effect of prior interactions on
technical detail, nor can it explain the interaction effect
of IT expertise. In the latter case, this would amount
to saying that the common method bias is stronger in
one half of the sample (ﬁrms with IT expertise) than in
the other (ﬁrms without such expertise), and in the case
of the former, the bias would have to vary in magni-
tude and direction with the number of prior interactions.
Hence, from a conceptual standpoint, common method
bias does not seem like a signiﬁcant threat to the validity
of our results. Nonetheless, we applied Harman’s one-
factor test on the underlying items to assess possible
common factors (Harman 1967, Podsakoff and Organ
1986). We found that the dependent and independent
variables did not load on the same factor, and no single
factor explained a majority of the variance. Therefore,
common method bias does not drive our results.
To control for any systematic distortion caused by our
reliance on retrospective data, we also included a con-
trol for the age of the transaction, which is the time in
years between the purchase of the product and the sur-
vey. The control was not signiﬁcant and did not inﬂuence
our results. In addition, we explored whether variations
in data collection affected our results. The surveys were
collected in 1995 and in 1998, and for some a researcher
was present. We inserted dummies for the year of sur-
vey and for the presence of a researcher. Adding these
controls did not change our results.
Because for each individual technical clause a con-
siderable number of observations score zero (i.e., not
applicable), we reestimated all models with a Tobit spec-
iﬁcation. Nonapplicability is treated as endogenous in
Tobit models. For this speciﬁcation we coded the aggre-
gate measure as not applicable if any of the technical
clauses was zero. The results were in line with those
of OLS. Furthermore, Tobit analyses on individual tech-
nical items gave results largely consistent with those
reported here. We choose to report the latter, because
OLS is much more robust to violations of distributional
assumptions. In addition, we also estimated a Heckman
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model for technical detail as a different way to account
for the possibility that different processes drive applica-
bility and detail conditional on applicability. We found
no evidence in our setting to support this. We can there-
fore treat “not applicable” as a low value of detail as we
do in the OLS results.
Because technical and legal detail are measured in dif-
ferent ways, we also recoded technical detail in ways
such that it more closely matches legal detail (which
is based on the presence of individual clauses). We
dichotomized each technical clause by coding it as
one when present and as zero when absent (similar to
legal clauses).10 We ran logit models on three differ-
ent measures: (1) on the individual clauses; (2) on an
aggregate measure, which is one only if all four tech-
nical clauses are present; and (3) on an aggregate mea-
sure, which is one if at least one technical clause is
present. The logit results for aggregate and individual
technical measures yielded similar results as those we
present here. Finally, we also ran OLS models on a
continuous aggregate measure of technical detail, which
was the standardized average of the four dichotomized
clauses. Effect sizes were comparable, though signif-
icance levels were lower (because of reduced vari-
ance). Hence, it seems appropriate to directly compare
technical and legal detail. Nonetheless, we acknowl-
edge the limitations of our legal detail measure. Future
research would surely beneﬁt from measuring the extent
of detail in both clauses on a more directly comparable
basis.
Discussion
In this study, our goal has been to broaden our under-
standing of how contractual detail is shaped by prior
interactions between contracting parties. To disentangle
the learning effect from other possible consequences of
prior interactions, we focused on conditions when the
learning effect was relatively stronger. Further, given
prior ﬁndings of both positive and negative associa-
tions between prior interactions and contractual detail,
we opted to study changes in the marginal effects of
prior interactions on contractual detail as a function of
predicted differences in the magnitude of the learning
effect. Although the ﬁndings for the differences between
clauses (Hypothesis 1) are weaker than those for IT
expertise (Hypothesis 2), together they demonstrate the
existence of a learning effect. In the light of the difﬁculty
of obtaining detailed contract data, these ﬁndings also
provide a promising initial attempt to understand when
the learning effect is likely to be particularly strong
(or weak).
Our ﬁndings suggest some speculations about other
possible consequences of prior interactions as well. Our
results indicate both downward sloping and upward slop-
ing components to the relationship between prior inter-
actions and technical detail in contracts. This is not
the case for legal clauses, where we ﬁnd no evidence
of an upward sloping relationship at all. Instead, we
ﬁnd that prior interactions decrease the amount of legal
detail, consistent in spirit with some prior work, such as
Batenburg et al. (2003) and Buskens (2002). These ﬁnd-
ings support our hypothesis of stronger learning effects
on technical clauses, but this also suggests that learn-
ing dominates other consequences of relationship history
that might discourage the use of detailed contracts for
high levels of interaction in technical clauses, but not in
legal clauses. Thus, it is useful to distinguish different
kinds of contractual clauses on the basis of the potential
for experience to generate new insights.
We also ﬁnd that the learning effect on technical
detail is enhanced (positively moderated) by expertise
in the product domain. We found that relevant expertise
increased the learning effect to such an extent that the
upward sloping portion of the relationship commenced
for fewer prior interactions. The presence of relevant
expertise for the transacting ﬁrms thus affects the role
of contracts within their relationships—for such ﬁrms
formal contracts gain more rapidly in importance.
Trust: An (Unobserved) Alternative Explanation?
Our ﬁndings indicating a negative relationship between
prior interactions and contractual detail (at low levels
of prior interactions for technical detail and at all lev-
els of prior interactions for legal detail) may suggest to
some scholars the possibility of a trust effect (Crocker
and Reynolds 1993, Parkhe 1993, Gulati 1995, Corts
and Singh 2004). In this section, we discuss whether
it is possible for our ﬁndings to be explained by such
a trust effect alone, without need for our hypothesized
learning effect. We acknowledge that because we do not
directly study trust or its moderators, we cannot state
with certainty that the downward sloping portion of the
relationship we uncover between prior interactions and
contractual detail is solely due to trust. However we
will speculate about whether arguments rooted in trust
alone could be sufﬁcient to explain our ﬁndings (inval-
idating the need to invoke learning at all) even if one
were to assume that the downward sloping portion of our
relationships between prior interactions and contractual
detail arose purely from increasing levels of trust.
In the spirit of Stinchcombe (1987), we contrast the
empirical ﬁndings with our theory based on learning
(possibly coexisting with trust) and with that of a the-
ory based on trust alone (see Table 3). We ﬁnd that a
“trust only” story can possibly explain just the U-shaped
effect of prior interactions on technical detail, if one
makes an ad hoc assumption that the trust effect is ini-
tially negative and eventually positive (Finding I). How-
ever, in that case, trust alone cannot explain our other
three ﬁndings. As technical and legal clauses feature in
the same contract and affect the same partners, courts
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Table 3 Alternative Explanations
Our interpretation
Learning (possibly Alternative explanation 1 Alternative explanation 2
Finding Hypothesis coexisting with trust) Trust only Positive and negative learning only
(I) Prior interactions has a
U-shaped effect on
technical detail.
Nonhypothesized
ﬁnding
Consistent—with a
learning effect that
is initially
dominated by a
negative trust
effect.
Consistent—with the
additional assumption
that trust has a negative
effect for low values of
prior interactions and a
positive one for high
values.
Consistent—with the additional
assumption that learning has a
negative effect for low values of
prior interactions and a positive
effect for high values.
(II) Marginal effect of prior
interactions greater on
technical than on legal
detail for high values
of prior interactions.
H1: The marginal
effect of prior
interactions is
greater on
technical than
legal detail.
Consistent—at lower
values of prior
interactions a
strong negative
trust effect may
mask differences
in learning.
Inconsistent—technical
and legal detail feature
in same contract and
should be similarly
affected by prior
interactions.
Inconsistent—if legal detail is initially
downward sloping due to
negative learning, then legal
detail should increase for high
values of prior interactions (like
technical detail (see I)).
(III) Marginal effect of
prior interactions on
technical detail
stronger with IT
expertise at mean of
prior interactions.
H2: IT expertise
positively
moderates the
marginal effect of
prior interactions
on technical
detail.
Consistent. Inconsistent—if IT
expertise leads to more
trust and trust has a
negative effect initially
(see I), then marginal
effect of prior interaction
should be lower with IT
expertise.
Inconsistent—if a ﬂip in the learning
effect exists (see I), then IT
expertise should negatively
moderate prior interactions initially
(which is not the case) and
positively moderate for high
values.
(IV) Marginal effect of
prior interactions on
legal detail the same
with or without IT
expertise.
Nonhypothesized
ﬁnding
Consistent—learning
effect on legal
detail is itself small.
Inconsistent—if IT
expertise affects trust,
then marginal effect of
prior interactions should
be different.
(Possibly) consistent—if IT expertise
is not relevant for leveraging
learning in legal clauses.
However, inconsistent with the
ﬁnding that legal expertise does
not moderate the effect of prior
interactions on legal detail.
will not distinguish between them in terms of enforce-
ability. Therefore, the trust effect should operate equally
on both technical and legal clauses. This is not con-
sistent with the different effect of prior interactions on
technical and legal detail (Finding II). Also, even if IT
expertise leads to higher trust—e.g., because of a shared
organizational category and adherence to the same rules
and norms (Kramer 1999)—and the trust effect is ini-
tially negative (necessary to explain Finding I), then the
marginal effect of prior interaction on technical detail
should be lower with IT expertise. This is inconsis-
tent with Finding III. Finally, if IT expertise affects the
level of trust, then the marginal effect of prior inter-
actions on legal detail should be different in the pres-
ence or absence of IT expertise. We ﬁnd no difference
(Finding IV).
In contrast, our theory of learning (possibly in con-
junction with trust) is consistent with all four ﬁndings.
The U-shaped effect is consistent with a learning effect
that is initially masked by a trust effect (Finding I).
Findings II and III are consistent with our hypotheses.
Finally, the absence of an IT moderation effect of prior
interactions on IT expertise is consistent with the argu-
ment that the learning effect on legal detail is small
(Finding IV). In conclusion, trust alone cannot explain
our results. Our evidence is strongly supportive of a
learning effect that operates more strongly for certain
kinds of clauses and transactors, as we have argued it
should. This is not to rule out the possible simultaneous
operation of a trust effect.11
Limitations and Possible Extensions
Like any research, our study also has some limitations.
Our arguments about the moderating impact of rele-
vant expertise assume that it only affects the learning
effect, not other consequences of repeated interaction
(i.e., trust). Although this is a reasonable assumption at
a conceptual level, our coarse-grained measure, which
captures the presence of employees in the buyer ﬁrm
with IT expertise, may violate this assumption. As we
note in Table 3, we do not ﬁnd evidence for this because
IT expertise does not moderate the relationship between
prior interactions and legal detail. Nonetheless, we do
believe that further examination of the complex relation-
ships between learning, trust formation, and coordination
would prove both theoretically and empirically fruitful.
Furthermore, such research would undoubtedly beneﬁt
from a more direct measurement of drivers of learning.
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Despite several robustness checks we conducted, we also
believe that this line of research would beneﬁt from lon-
gitudinal data. This would allow us to conﬁrm that IT
expertise is strengthening learning from prior interac-
tions and to rule out the possibility that ﬁrms strengthen
their expertise after technically detailed contracts are
written. Also, with longitudinal data, the accuracy of the
measures would not be threatened by retrospective bias.
Our ﬁndings also suggest some directions for future
research into the relationships between trust, learning,
and contractual complexity. If we assume that the neg-
ative relationships we uncovered between prior inter-
actions and contractual detail are indeed driven by
increasing trust, then several intriguing possibilities arise
for further research. For instance, a minimal level of
trust may be necessary before any learning is feasible.
This might explain why the learning effect only dom-
inates in our sample at higher level of prior interac-
tions. Relatedly, the learning effect may become more
powerful when it is leveraged by trust; that would
account for the sharply upward sloping portion of the
relationship between prior interactions and contractual
detail.12 A corollary to these propositions is that even
if trust in relationships is high, contracts could still
be highly detailed. This is consistent with the ﬁnd-
ings of Poppo and Zenger (2002), who ﬁnd in their
study of IT procurement that longevity of a relation-
ship is positively correlated with the closeness of the
relationship, which in turn is positively related to con-
tractual complexity. If the “trust ﬁrst, learning later”
pattern we speculated on above proves to be valid,
this would also suggest that whether trust and contrac-
tual detail are positively related could depend on the
average number of prior interactions in the sample, as
trust and contractual detail could be negatively related
for low numbers of prior interactions but positively for
high numbers. This could provide a rationale for why
some prior studies ﬁnd a negative correlation between
measures of prior interactions (as proxies for trust)
and contractual detail (e.g., Parkhe 1993), but others
report a positive correlation (e.g., Ryall and Sampson
2009). This would reinforce our contention that it is
not possible to make ﬁrst-order predictions about the
relationship between prior interactions and contractual
detail.
Another valuable empirical extension would be to
explicitly incorporate data about the supplier and its
characteristics, as both parties inﬂuence the contract-
ing process and its outcome. Where we have focused
on buyer characteristics, future research may, for exam-
ple, explore the effects of the supplier’s familiarity with
the buyer’s products and processes on contractual detail.
Reﬂecting on these limitations and potential extensions,
we remain convinced that further research into the role
of contracts as coordination devices and an analysis of
the mechanisms by which they change over time is an
extremely fruitful area for research.
Conclusion
The economic literature on contracting as well as its
sociologically rooted criticisms (Granovetter 1985, Ring
and Van de Ven 1992, Gulati 1995) share a common
view of contracts—that they are primarily a means to
minimize the consequences of incentive conﬂict. Yet
contracts also perform an important coordinative func-
tion by establishing common ground and shared under-
standing about the transaction.13 In one of the seminal
papers on contracting, Macaulay notes that lawyers often
complain that “businessmen desire to ‘keep it simple and
avoid red tape’ even when large amounts of money and
signiﬁcant risks are involved. One stated that he was sick
of being told ‘We can trust old Max,’ when the problem
is not one of honesty but one of reaching an agreement
that both sides understand” (1963, pp. 58–59, empha-
sis added). Prior interactions between the same partners
provide an important means by which such shared under-
standing can build up, and the contract can function as a
focal repository for such knowledge (Mayer and Argyres
2004). Hence, the learning effect is very relevant even
if the contracting parties trust each other. The empirical
challenge lies in being able to disentangle the learning
effect from other consequences of relationship history,
such as trust, which some studies suggest leads to less
detailed contracts.
This study tackles the problem of identifying the
learning effect by focusing on the conditions under
which the learning effect is likely to be stronger and
on changes in the marginal effects of prior interactions
as a consequence. We show that the learning effect is
stronger for technical than for legal clauses in contracts
and is stronger for ﬁrms with technical expertise rele-
vant to the product domain than for ﬁrms without such
expertise. In sum, learning effects may result in more
detailed contracts between partners interacting repeat-
edly when there is much to be learned through repeated
interactions, and it can be learned effectively.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to the ISCORE group of the Fac-
ulty of Sociology of Utrecht University for providing access
to their data, and in particular to Vincent Buskens, Werner
Raub, Gerrit Rooks, and Chris Snijders for insightful discus-
sions. The authors thank seminar participants at INSEAD,
the London Business School, Tanaka Business School, Uni-
versity of Southern Denmark, and Utrecht University, and
Julie Davidson, Manuel Hensmans, Madan Pillutla, Maurice
Schellekens, Kannan Srikanth, Catalina Stefanescu, Wendy
van der Valk, and Freek Vermeulen for helpful comments. The
authors also appreciate the insightful and constructive com-
ments of the editor Bill McEvily and the reviewers. Puranam
acknowledges funding from the Mack Center for Technolog-
ical Innovation at the Wharton School. Vanneste gratefully
acknowledges a Marie Curie Fellowship with the European
Union. The views presented in this article are not necessarily
the views of the European Commission.
Vanneste and Puranam: Repeated Interactions and Contractual Detail
Organization Science 21(1), pp. 186–201, © 2010 INFORMS 199
Appendix A. Key Constructs
Construct Items
Technical detail Indicate for each topic the extent of speciﬁcation in the main contract: 1= very broadly,
5= very detailed. (If a certain technical aspect does not apply, indicate “not applicable.”)
(a) Security (c) Deﬁnition (of) system boundaries
(b) User friendliness (d) Deﬁnition (of) system functions
Legal detail Indicate for each topic whether it was not arranged (0), only orally arranged (1), or
arranged in writing (2).
(a) Penalties on late payment (f) Nondisclosure user
(b) Liability supplier (g) Insurance supplier
(c) Force majeure supplier (h) Duration service
(d) Warranties supplier (i) Dispute resolution
(e) Intellectual property (escrow) (j) Terms of notice
Prior interactions How often has your ﬁrm done business with the supplier before the purchase
of this product? 0= never, 5=many times.
Expertise Does your ﬁrm have one or more employees with speciﬁc expertise in
the following areas? 0= no, 1= yes.
(a) IT (b) Legal
Endnotes
1Contractual incompleteness is a widely used concept in the lit-
erature on contracts (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore
1990). Contractual completeness can be deﬁned as the ratio
of speciﬁed clauses over relevant clauses. Bounded rational-
ity afﬂicts not only contracting parties but also the scholars
who study contracts, so it is not feasible to list all relevant
clauses for a contract. Therefore, it is impossible to empiri-
cally measure contractual (in)completeness. In line with previ-
ous research, we focus instead on contractual detail, which is
the extent to which clauses are speciﬁed in the contract (Poppo
and Zenger 2002, Mayer and Argyres 2004, Ryall and Sampson
2009).
2On the phone each respondent was asked to mention at least
one product in each of the four categories (simple or complex
X software or hardware). A randomized computer procedure
picked a single product, ensuring sufﬁcient products from each
category in our sample.
3Note that alternative coding schemes in which we code “not
arranged” as zero and both “oral agreements” and “written
agreements” as one, or in which we code “no arrangements”
and “oral agreements” as zero and “written agreements” as one
do not affect our results.
4Because Cronbach’s alpha uses variances or Pearson corre-
lations, it is not well deﬁned for ordinal data (on which this
scale is based). However, if we assume (a) an underlying con-
tinuous variable and (b) that the observed scores for each item
are realizations of that variable given certain threshold values
(0, 1, 2, in our case), we can still calculate alpha using the
standard methods. We used Monte Carlo simulations to assess
the sensitivity of alpha to different threshold values for the
categories “oral” and “written.” In 10,000 runs we ﬁxed the
threshold value of “not arranged” at 0 and randomly allowed
the threshold value for “oral” to be anywhere between 0 and 2;
for “written” it was allowed to be between the threshold value
of “oral” and 2. We found that all values of Cronbach’s alpha
were between 0.82 and 0.84. We thus conclude that Cronbach’s
alpha is not sensitive to scaling in our setting and can be appro-
priately used as an indication of reliability.
5The pattern of results when analyzing the 10 legal items sepa-
rately as dependent variables is similar to the one reported here
for the aggregate measure (though signiﬁcance levels are lower
because of increased measurement error).
6We center this variable for constructing interaction terms with
IT expertise.
7Because we cluster observations from the same buyer to cor-
rect for nonindependence, it is technically not possible to
include a dummy for this single observation and generate an
F statistic. When using clusters, the F statistic is based on the
robustly estimated variance error matrix, which is in this case
not of sufﬁcient rank to calculate the F statistic.
8We also included separate dummy variables for each of the
15 components instead of our product complexity measure. The
results were qualitatively unaffected.
9Because legal expertise may be more relevant to legal detail
than technical expertise, we also estimated the interaction
effects between the linear and squared term of prior interac-
tions and legal expertise on legal detail. The interaction effects
were not signiﬁcant individually, nor were they jointly signiﬁ-
cant (p= 050). This is consistent with the weak learning effect
in our data for legal detail.
10Results for these additional analyses are available on request.
11We also considered the possibility that the negative effects for
prior interactions are due to “negative” learning—i.e., through
repeated interactions exchange partners learn which clauses are
irrelevant and subsequently remove those from the contract.
However, a theory based on negative and positive learning can-
not explain our four main ﬁndings (see Table 3).
12We thank two anonymous reviewers for these useful insights.
13Note that technical and legal detail both capture elements of
incentive alignment and coordination, and a one-to-one map-
ping between these is not plausible.
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